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ABSTRACT
We propose a new model for regulation to achieve AI safety: global regulatory
markets. We first sketch the model in general terms and provide an overview
of the costs and benefits of this approach. We then demonstrate how the model
might work in practice: responding to the risk of adversarial attacks on AI models
employed in commercial drones.
1 INTRODUCTION
Ensuring that humans benefit from AI will depend on our capacity to regulate how it is built and
deployed. There are risks arising from misuse of powerful technology and from misalignment be-
tween the goals an AI system is pursuing and the true goals of a relevant group of humans. Con-
taining both types of risks requires adapting our existing regulatory systems and building new tools
to regulate how AI is built, used, and safeguarded against use by malicious actors. Our existing
regulatory systems are, however, struggling to keep up with the challenges posed by a fast-moving
technology-driven global economy (Marchant et al., 2011; Hadfield, 2017) and AI only promises
further challenges.
Regulatory strategies developed in the public sector operate on a time scale that is much slower than
AI progress, and governments have limited public funds for investing in the regulatory innovation
to keep up with the complexity of AI’s evolution. AI also operates on a global scale that is mis-
aligned with regulatory regimes organized on the basis of the nation state. This leads to competitive
dynamics that manifest at the level of companies and nations: pressure to keep up in the geopolitical
sphere sharpens the collective action problem further, with national regulation potentially slowed or
foregone in the interests of maintaining competitiveness.
Examples of the ways in which our existing regulatory regimes are struggling to keep up with even
the relatively contained uses of AI we see deployed today abound. Machine learning algorithms
deployed in the criminal justice system, such as the COMPAS algorithms used in U.S. bail hearings
and sentencing, have well-known problems with racial bias that courts are poorly equipped to ad-
dress: court challenges are costly, many defendants affected by biased algorithms are represented
by severely overburdened public defenders with limited resources to investigate and limited to no
access to software tools comparable to those available to enforcement,1; trade secret laws and con-
tracts with private software providers often block scrutiny of these algorithms. The targeted use of
machine learning algorithms to flood social networks with fake news and malicious bots imperson-
ating real people have contributed to the effort to interfere with elections and undermined public
confidence in electoral systems in both the U.S. and Europe. U.S. Congressional hearings into the
Cambridge Analytica scandal, in which massive amounts of personal data were collected to feed
AI-powered political influence campaigns, demonstrated how little legislators understood about the
problem they were called on to address.
No good solutions are in sight: our existing systems lack the capacity, for example, to reliably
identify fake news without human input, which is infeasible on volumes seen by platforms like
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Facebook. Google still has not developed a solution to the problem it discovered in its AI-powered
photo tagging algorithms, which tagged black people as gorillas, other than to eliminate gorilla from
the available labels. The self-driving car industries still do not have effective regulatory regimes in
place that balance the risks of these technologies against their benefits; following a 2018 crash, Uber
suspended entirely its deployment of self-driving cars. The 2018 changes to privacy law in Europe–
the General Data Protection Regulation–have ambitious goals including the right to have irrelevant
or obsolete data removed from search engines and explanations given for AI-based decisions. But
governments have few tools to implement these promises. Implementation is still widely dependent
on the voluntary or self-regulatory efforts of the companies deploying AI. And indeed, most of the
regulatory effort we see is in the realm of self-regulation and industry standard-setting, such as the
development of IEEE guidelines on ethical AI. These are laudable efforts but ultimately leave the
bulk of the power to determine how AI is, and is not, used in the hands of commercial entities with
a conflict of interest.
Adding to the challenge are competitive race dynamics: Companies competing in markets have
an incentive to build AI faster than their competitors, and as the above examples show, assuring the
safety of large-scale machine learning-driven systems appears to be both costly and difficult; slowing
that process down while encouraging an environment for investment to ensure safe development is
a collective action problem that regulation is needed to address.
Military and national interests are also prompting a competitive environment, with China announc-
ing in 2017 a goal to be a world class leader in AI theory, technology, and application by 2030.
This and other related national plans and investment initiatives around the world have ratcheted up
tensions in how nations cultivate their own technology sectors, while countering the perceived influ-
ences of other countries. These elevated tensions have been most recently dramatized by the United
State’s actions against Huawei which have included bans on the company contracting with US com-
panies without government approval, causing spillover effects that seem set to lead to Huawei al-
tering its technological supply chain. Situations like this highlight how pressure to keep up in the
geopolitical sphere sharpens the collective action problem further still, with national regulation and
international collaboration potentially slowed or foregone in the interests of maintaining national
competitiveness.
We can adapt regulatory systems to keep up with AI and the broader trend of more advanced digital
technologies by accelerating the pace and quality of efforts to innovate better ways to regulate a
rapidly evolving percentage of the world’s R&D and industrial base. One way to do this is by making
public sector regulation more responsive, following the lead of industry approaches to developing
goods and services; this is the challenge of agile governance (Forum, 2018). But public sector
solutions are inevitably limited. Increasing the ability to generate innovative regulatory approaches
is likely to require moving more of the problem of regulation out of the domain of the public sector
and into the domain of markets: creating markets for regulation that attract money and talent to the
problem.
A critical challenge for ensuring that AI follows a safe and beneficial path of development, then, is
to find ways to adapt our regulatory systems to the pace, complexity, and global reach of AI and to
do so in ways that are simultaneously:
• as smart as the AI systems they seek to regulate
• not dictated by industry actors alone
• capable of coordinating across nations.
In this paper, we propose a new approach to regulation that meets these three challenges: global reg-
ulatory markets. In this approach, governments create a market for regulation in which private sector
organizations compete to achieve regulatory outcomes set by a government regulator. We envisage
regulatory markets as being regulated at national and international scale. Any regulatory market is
composed of three principal actors: The targets of regulation, private regulators, and governments.
Targets are businesses and other organizations the behavior of which governments seek to regulate.
In the AI context, these are companies and public agents that are building and/or deploying AI as
products or processes. Private regulators are for-profit and non-profit corporations/organizations that
enter into the business of developing and supplying regulatory services which they compete to sell to
targets. Governments require targets to purchase regulatory services (entering into a regulatory con-
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tract with a private regulator) and directly regulate private regulators and the market for regulatory
services, ensuring it operates in the public interest.
A key distinction between regulatory markets and self-regulation is that in regulatory markets the
overall outcomes that must be achieved by regulation are determined by the government and not the
regulated entity itself. Governments in this regime design and oversee the structure of the regulatory
market and regulate the entities within it.
Our discussion is organized as follows. We first review the existing regulatory landscape, identi-
fying the tools, mechanisms, and institutions available to governments seeking to ensure that AI
technologies are developed and deployed in accordance with politically-set goals. We then lay out
the details of our model and develop these details in the concrete setting of commercial drone reg-
ulation. In subsequent sections we discuss the benefits and risks of this approach to regulation,
including the risk of capture and collusion and how these risks might be addressed through market
design. We spend some time examining four examples of existing reliance on hybrid public-private
regulation. Two of these show the limits of these mechanisms in complex and global settings outside
of the AI domain and highlight lessons for improved regulatory design: credit rating agencies in the
context of the 2008 global financial crisis and the 2018-2019 Boeing 737-MAX crashes. Two other
examples–the use of private certification providers to oversee medical device quality and the reliance
on approved regulators in legal services in the United Kingdom–suggest other more hopeful lessons
that can be drawn. We conclude with thoughts on how this model might be implemented initially
through voluntary industry efforts as a precursor to government oversight and how a government
ready to pilot this system could begin.
2 THE EXISTING REGULATORY LANDSCAPE
Modern societies rely on multiple systems to channel the behavior of people and organizations in
ways that are consistent with collectively-determined interests. Markets channel resources towards
the production of goods and services that people want (as expressed by demand) and using processes
that minimize the cost of production. Tax and subsidy laws redistribute income so as to ensure that
the capacity to register values with demand is more fairly shared. Regulatory agencies develop
rules and procedures to improve the performance of markets: protecting contract and property in-
terests, deterring fraud and collusion, and overcoming market failures and externalities. Political
systems give people the opportunity to choose their representatives or run for office themselves.
Constitutions encode broad commitments to freedom or anti-discrimination and limit the power of
governments; courts, constituents, and a free press monitor compliance with those commitments.
2.1 METHODS OF REGULATION
There are currently four principal methods for regulating markets and industries (May, 2007; Car-
rigan & Coglianese, 2011). The traditional, and most widely used, approach is prescriptive, some-
times called command-and-control. Prescriptive regulation supplies specific and sometimes highly
detailed rules governing behavior, technology, and/or processes; failure to comply with the rules
generates penalties (fines, loss of authority to provide goods or services, criminal sanctions, etc.)
Also traditional and widely used is licensing (which can also be thought of as a form of prescriptive
regulation and is also called prior approval): the requirement of obtaining and maintaining autho-
rization before providing goods or services in markets. Initial authorization can require completion
of prescribed education, testing of individuals or products, inspection and evaluation of facilities or
processes, or an evaluation of and plan for managing potential risks (Ogus, 2004; Kleiner, 2000).
Maintenance of a valid license can require ongoing compliance with regulations. Operating without
a license is penalized.
In recent decades, these traditional forms of regulation have been supplemented with new gover-
nance techniques. Performance-based regulation (also called outcomes-based or principles-based)
specifies results (sometime expressed as metrics, sometimes expressed only as principles) that a
provider must achieve but does not specify how the provider is to achieve those results (Coglianese
et al., 2003; May, 2011). Failure to achieve outcomes is penalized. Management-based regulation
(also called process-oriented, risk-based, or enforced self-regulation) requires firms to evaluate the
risks generated by their business and to develop their plan for how those risks will be managed.
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Plans might need approval from government or a third-party certification agency. Failure to gener-
ate a plan as required and/or to abide by the plan is penalized (Gilad, 2011; Coglianese et al., 2003;
Braithwaite, 1981; Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; Braithwaite, 2011). Meta-regulation embeds these
new governance techniques in a system in which both regulated entities and government regulators
continually learn from experience to update required processes and outcomes (Gilad, 2010).
The move to new modes of regulation has been fostered by the perception that traditional approaches
inhibit both efficiency and innovation in the achievement of regulatory goals. The theory of new
governance approaches is that government should find ways to harness the expertise and cost-
minimizing incentives of industry itself in the pursuit of politically-established outcomes such as
a safe food supply, reduced pollution, or stable financial systems. These are insights on which our
model of regulatory markets are premised.
2.2 PRIVATE REGULATION
Although we think of regulation as a state-led activity, private non-state actors have long played a
role in regulation and there are many examples of a shift from command-and-control to outcome-
based, principles-based or risk-based regulation (Gilad, 2010). As emphasized in Hadfield (2017),
there is an economic demand for legal infrastructure to make market (and other) interactions more
reliable and productive and as a result private entities can in some cases find a profitable opportunity
to supply rules to meet that demand; in other settings, private actors can meet the demand for legal
infrastructure by collectively establishing industry standards and funding an oversight mechanism.
There is a robust literature in political science examining these forms of voluntary “private regula-
tion” (Buthe, 2010). For example, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) provides
voluntary standards in areas ranging from quality (ISO9000) and the environment to risk manage-
ment and food safety. Globally, food safety standards are implemented with a broad mix of public
standard-setting and private certification and monitoring to ensure compliance (Rouviere & Royer,
2017).
Voluntary submission to regulation can also go beyond voluntary compliance, as when voluntarily
chosen standards are made enforceable through contract. Publicly-enforceable standards of conduct
are privately written into contracts both by parties to the contract, as when an online retailer sets
out rules governing privacy and data usage in its terms of service, and by third parties, as when
trade associations require their members to use the organizations contract terms (Bernstein, 1996).
Global companies such as Nike, Apple, and Walmart now routinely use their supply chain con-
tracts to impose standards pertaining to subjects such as quality control, environmental practices,
workplace safety, and child labor on suppliers in countries with underdeveloped or dysfunctional
regulatory systems (Locke, 2013). In many cases, supplier compliance with supply contract obli-
gations is monitored and enforced by private sanctions (contract termination, fines) imposed by the
purchasing company, which may outsource oversight to a third-party monitor (Short et al., 2016).
An example of this is the response of large retailers in the garment industry to the 2013 collapse of
the Rana Plaza factory and the 2012 Tazreen Fashions factory fire, both in Bangladesh. American
retailers such as the Gap established the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety which created a set
of workplace safety standards for members to incorporate into their supply contracts and a monitor-
ing facility to inspect factories for compliance.2 European retailers such as H&M went beyond the
Alliance approach in response to the Bangladeshi disasters and established the Accord on Fire and
Building Safety in Bangladesh.3 The Accord makes the achievement of workplace safety standards
and commitments to fund safety programs in Bangladeshi factories subject to third-party enforce-
ment (arbitration) and is overseen by a governing board that includes union representatives and is
chaired by a representative from the UN’s International Labour Organization (ILO).
Even if we limit our purview to mandatory regulation, however, where regulation is imposed by
the state, private entities have long been a significant presence. There are numerous examples of
cases in which public regulation has piggybacked on systems initially developed privately4 and this
creates an incentive for industries to organize self-regulation in order to shape what is seen as in-
2http://www.bangladeshworkersafety.org/
3http://bangladeshaccord.org/
4Securities regulation originated, for example, in the private regimes developed by stock exchanges (Macey
& O’Hara, 1999; Seligman, 2003; Birdthistle & Henderson, 2013).
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evitable public regulation (Parker, 1990; Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000). Private actors also play an
indirect role through their influence over government regulation (Haas, 1992). Standards developed
by private standard-setting bodies–membership organizations such as the Society of Automotive
Engineers, for example–are sometimes incorporated into legislation.5 Privately-developed rules (es-
tablished and sometimes monitored by industry bodies or by individual firms such as insurers) can
also be imposed by government as a condition of obtaining a government contract or permit. Private
membership organizations are sometimes delegated authority to regulate their members on behalf
of government actors; examples include FINRA and bar associations. The demand for transnational
regulatory standards in our increasingly integrated global economy has also resulted in increasing
reliance on private actors to regulate. As with domestic regulation, there has long been widespread
reliance on international standard-setting bodies to supply the rules governing goods and services
sold in global markets (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000; Buthe & Mattli, 2011).
As we have noted, the pressure to develop “new governance” alternatives to conventional command-
and-control regulation arises largely as a consequence of the growing need for what is sometimes
called “agile” governance (World Economic Forum 2016, World Economic Forum 2018) in the face
of rapid change and high levels of complexity. The much-heralded creation of a broad European
“right to be forgotten” in search results, for example, has been implemented by requiring search
engines to themselves serve the function of hearing and “adjudicating” claims; in 2016 Google es-
timated its internal “quasi-judicial” panels were evaluating close to 600 claims a day. This pressure
to default back to self-regulation is a response to limited technical and financial resources in gov-
ernments.6 AI amplifies this pressure.
Self-regulation will undoubtedly play an important role in the emerging regulatory ecosystem for AI.
But self-regulation lacks a critical dimension for effective regulation, namely political accountabil-
ity. Self-regulation does not take place in a vacuum of accountability–indeed, many self-regulatory
efforts are responsive to politics as they are efforts to ward off direct government regulation. But
self-regulation is not formally or transparently subject to accountable oversight, by definition.
A central goal of our proposal for regulatory markets is to develop a framework of oversight and
public accountability for private regulation. We propose a method for harnessing the power of
markets to develop more agile and technically sophisticated forms of regulation that does not require
defaulting to self-regulation. Instead, our approach is to create a new market layer of independent
private regulators who are subject to government oversight while simultaneously responsive to the
on-the-ground realities of fast-moving, complex, and global AI technologies.
3 LIMITS OF EXISTING REGULATORY METHODS FOR AI
Figuring out how to control or channel AI is a technical and system design challenge comparable to
the challenge of figuring out how to build and deploy AI in the first place. The latter challenge is pri-
marily being addressed by markets. Research organizations (for-profit corporations such as Google
as well as universities and non-profit organizations such as the Vector Institute), even when they
make use of government support, rely heavily on private investors to cover the costs of recruiting
top engineering and other talent, buying (and building) powerful computers, conducting experi-
ments, and bringing researchers together for scientific exchange and collaboration. Even China,
with massive public sector participation in the economy, will rely heavily on channeling private
investment into AI to achieve its national goals of AI dominance (Lee, 2018).
Private investors support the research effort in AI because they anticipate the opportunity to benefit
financially (and to some extent personally) from the research. There are (coarse) data that suggest
private investors already out-spend governments on certain key areas: consider, for instance, that in
2017 the US National Science Foundation’s total spend was about $6 billion dollars, and that NSF
believed this made it responsible for 83% of the total funding for computer science R&D that year.
By comparison, Alphabet Inc. alone spent $16.5 billion on R&D in its 2017 fiscal year.
5See, e.g., 16 CCR 3351.6 “Equipment Requirements for Automotive Air Conditioning Repair Dealers”
(all automotive repair dealers engaged in service or repair of air conditioning systems in vehicles must have
refrigerant identification equipment that meets or exceeds Society of Automotive Engineers standard J1771,
“which is hereby incorporated by reference.”)
6https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/19/technology/google-europe-privacy-watchdog.html?module=inline;
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/24/technology/europe-google-right-to-be-forgotten.html
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Current research efforts in the domain of designing regulatory systems, however, take place primar-
ily in the public sector. The work being done by the National Highway Transportation and Safety
Agency to develop a regulatory regime for self-driving vehicles is an example. In this domain, de-
sign efforts are driven by the incentives of politics and bureaucracies. This makes them reasonably
accountable to their constituents and gives them legitimacy to act on behalf of the public. But it
limits their resources to publicly-funded budgets and settings in which the incentives for people to
join the project are muted and research expenditures are more limited than they are in the private
sector. Moreover, it limits the domain of solutions to conventional methods of regulation: text-based
rules, public investigations and monitoring, prosecution of violators in administrative and judicial
proceedings, fines and prohibitions. The people participating in the effort are mostly trained in the
humanities and social sciences with limited computational expertise or knowledge of technology;
few with technical expertise come on board.
Private efforts to develop regulation are playing a growing role in AI. These efforts are coordinated
through non-governmental private standard-setting membership organizations (SSOs), such as the
ISO and the IEEE, and corporate participation in government standard-setting bodies, such as NIST
(which originated as a private organization in 1901 but is now an agency of the U.S. Department
of Commerce). All of these organizations, and more, have launched AI initiatives.7 In both public
standards agencies and private SSOs, resources from private corporations (regulated entities) are
devoted to regulatory development, generally by making participation as a volunteer on standard-
setting committees a component of corporate job descriptions.
Even taking into account these private resources, however, there is a tremendous imbalance in the
type and volume of R&D resources between those devoted to regulatory solutions for AI and those
devoted to building the technology we need to regulate.
These imbalances are an important source of AI risk. Consider for example the resources spent by
Volvo and other vehicle manufacturers to develop smart systems able to detect when the car was
being tested for compliance with emissions standards and adjust the cars performance to outwit
the test.8 In the regulatory race, private investment can generally outpace public expenditure. We
should anticipate that AI companies will face tremendous commercial incentives to minimize the
impact of regulation on their products and services; only robust and intelligent regulatory regimes
will be capable of reigning in those incentives.
The key to adapting our regulatory systems to keep up with powerful AI is to figure out how to ac-
celerate both the pace and quality of efforts to innovate better ways to regulate. One way to do this
is by making public sector regulation more experimental and responsive, following the lead of in-
dustry approaches to developing new goods and services; this is the challenge of “agile governance”
(Forum, 2018).
Regulatory sandboxes, for example, allow companies or whole industries to develop new goods,
services, and processes in a limited and closely-watched domain, without complying with existing
regulations, in order both to allow the innovation to develop and to allow regulators to learn about
what regulation might be needed before acting. China is characterized by some observers as pursu-
ing this approach to regulation: develop first, learn about the effects, then develop regulation (Lee,
2018).
Policy labs within government engage civil servants directly with the techniques of human-centered
design and data analytics to develop new methods of regulation and public service delivery.
In general, however, increasing the ability to generate innovative regulatory approaches is likely to
require moving more of the problem of regulation out of the domain of the public sector and into
the domain of markets: creating markets for regulation that attract money and brains (especially
engineering brains) to the problem.
A noted above, to some extent, this is already happening, primarily within private SSOs. But these
membership organizations tend to behave more like political bodies than the private sector (Birdthis-
tle & Henderson, 2013). They operate on the basis of committees composed of members, voting,
and consensus. The analogy to political bodies is not perfect: many do sell their standards and cer-
7https://standards.ieee.org/news/2017/ieee p7004.html; https://www.iso.org/news/ref2336.html
8https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/business/international/vw-diesel-emissions-scandal-
explained.html
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tification services and so there is some scope within which we can think of these organizations as
competing. But the nature of this competition is that the standards bodies compete to be adopted
voluntarily by a large enough segment of a relevant industry that they become the de facto global
standard. Thus they are not competitive markets in the full sense. Moreover, once the competition
is resolved in a given domain, there is the potential for stagnation. Continuing competition is key to
driving innovation.
As important as it is to recruit private sector incentives to the problem of producing more effec-
tive forms of regulation to keep up with technology and globalization, however, it is also critical
to ensure that regulation is legitimately anchored in the interests of relevant communities of peo-
ple. Current private standard setting is responsive to the public interest only indirectly–as channeled
through the interests of corporations in maintaining a good reputation for corporate social respon-
sibility with their customers, employees, and local governments. Moreover, participation in private
standard setting is voluntary. But private regulation of AI should not be controlled by corporations
that profit from AI or a few powerful people. Nor should it be entirely voluntary. It should have
mandatory components and be subject to more direct oversight than is true of private standard set-
ting today. Accomplishing that objective requires structuring these markets for regulation in a way
that is accountable to the public sector.
The other shortcoming of public sector efforts alone to address the regulatory gap for AI is the need
for truly global–transnational–solutions. Public sector regulation is currently organized primarily
on a nation-state basis. International agreements between states can coordinate regulation across
countries, but the implementation of global standards still happens through domestic regulatory
regimes. This is another reason that private SSOs have emerged as such an important player in
technology regulation: they are capable of generating standards that are developed at a transnational
level and implemented as such across multiple jurisdictions. The ISO, for example, is a membership
organization that is composed of country SSOs, one for each member country.
4 GLOBAL REGULATORY MARKETS
Increasing the ability to generate innovative regulatory approaches is likely to require moving more
of the problem of regulation out of the domain of the public sector and into the domain of markets:
creating markets for regulation that attract investments of human and financial capital in regulatory
innovation. We propose the following model of regulatory markets, building on new governance
models that incorporate non-governmental regulators and changing roles for private entities.
There are three principal actors in this model: The targets of regulation, private regulators, and
governments. Targets are businesses and other organizations that governments seek to regulate.
In the AI context, these are the companies or organizations building and deploying AI products
or services. Private regulators are for-profit and non-profit organizations that develop and supply
regulatory services which they compete to sell to targets. Governments require targets to purchase
regulatory services (entering into a regulatory contract with a private regulator) and directly regulate
the market for regulatory services, ensuring it operates in the public interest.
Private regulators could employ, but would not be limited to, conventional means of regulation;
the private regulator might also develop technologies that directly control or shape the business
decisions of the targets it regulates. They would gain their authority to regulate via the regulatory
contract with the target and authorization from governments to collect fines or impose requirements
on the targets that submit to their regulatory system.
Here are a few examples:
• A private regulator of self-driving cars might require self-driving car companies to allow
the regulator access to data produced by the vehicles and then use machine learning (ML) to
detect behaviors that raise the risk of accidents beyond thresholds set by the regulator. The
private regulator might bring these to the attention of the target and require risk-assessment;
or it might develop technology that allows the regulator to modify the algorithms or data
sources used by the targets vehicles.
• A private regulator in the banking industry might require a bank using ML to analyze cus-
tomer data and develop new products to implement differential privacy techniques (Dwork
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Figure 1: In conventional regulation, shown on the left, the government directly regulates entities. With reg-
ulatory markets, shown on the right, a private regulator directly regulates the targets that have purchased its
regulatory services, subject to oversight by government to ensure regulators are achieving outcomes set by
government. It does this by developing regulatory procedures, requirements, and technology.
& Roth, 2014) to minimize the likelihood that a customer is harmed by the use of their
data. The regulator could prescribe the specific techniques/algorithms to use; or it could
establish a procedure for the banks that it regulates to propose techniques that survive tests
conducted by the regulator.
• A private regulator of developers of drones equipped with facial recognition systems might
require companies to implement particular cybersecurity features to ensure their models are
not discoverable by malicious users. The regulator might also create systems that enable
people to raise flags about drone behavior to detect malicious use.
Regulatory techniques developed by private regulators might include hardware, risk assessment
tools, information processing systems, conflict or complaint management procedures, and so on.
In order to participate in the market by selling regulatory services to targets, private regulators must
be first licensed by the government in the jurisdictions in which they wish to operate. In any given
domain, multiple regulators are licensed so that they compete to provide regulatory services to tar-
gets. Targets must choose a regulator but they have the capacity to choose, and switch, regulators.
They do so by comparing across regulators in terms of the cost and efficiency of the services pro-
vided by regulators.
Private regulators do not compete, however, on the quality of their regulatory services, that is, the
extent to which they achieve public goals. This is because in order to obtain and maintain a license,
regulators must demonstrate their regulatory approach achieves outcomes that are mandated by gov-
ernment. Outcomes are metrics or principles set through the bureaucratic processes of the public
sector. They are the mechanism by which the delegation of regulatory oversight of target to private
actors is made legitimate.
For example:
• In the self-driving car context, governments could set thresholds for accident rates or traffic
congestion. They could establish principles such as maintaining public confidence in road
safety.
• In the banking industry, governments could set thresholds for access to credit by consumers.
They could establish principles such as traceability of transactions and maintenance of
confidence in the stability of financial markets.
• In the context of facial recognition use in drones, governments might establish thresholds
for the likelihood that software could be accessed by malicious users. They could establish
principles such as realistic consumer consent to recognition.
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The key here is a shift by government to establishing the goals of regulation, rather than the meth-
ods of achieving those goals. Methods are developed by the private regulators, and then tested by
governments. This testing would occur through a combination of upfront evaluation of the capacity
for a regulator’s system to satisfy government goals and ongoing auditing and oversight: measure-
ment of outcome metrics and assessment of the achievement of principles. For example, in the
self-driving car setting, governments may develop techniques to track accident and congestion rates
and assess the contribution of a particular regulator to excessive accidents or congestion. In banking,
governments could conduct periodic audits of random samples of transactions from the targets of a
particular regulator to determine the incidence of money-laundering. In drones, governments might
stress test a regulator’s procedures by employing adversarial efforts to infiltrate algorithms or data.
Regulators that fail to pass the tests set by governments would risk having their licenses suspended,
conditioned, or revoked. This requires governments to regulate to ensure that the market for private
regulators is competitive, ensuring that there is sufficient scale in a given domain to support multiple
regulators (possibly restricting the share of the target market that a given regulator can service) and
that targets have the capacity to switch regulators with relative ease. This obtains the benefits of
competition between regulators, spurring them to invest in developing more effective and less costly
means of achieving regulatory objectives.
Protecting the integrity of the market requires that private regulators are independent entities. They
must be neither formally nor informally controlled or captured by targets. This is critical to ensure
that the regulators incentives are to produce excellent regulation, not collaborate with targets to
reduce the quality of regulation.
Private regulators, ideally, are licensed by multiple governments, each implementing their own out-
come requirements. Search Oversight Inc., for example, could be licensed to regulate the relevance
of and consumer control over search engine results in many of the countries in which Google does
business. Similarly, Microsoft’s Bing might be regulated by a single regulator in many or most
of the countries in which it operates. But Google might be regulated by a different regulator than
Bing. Both, however, would be held by their regulators to achieving the same ultimate regulatory
outcomes.
5 LOCATING REGULATORY MARKETS ON THE LANDSCAPE OF REGULATION
Our proposal extends these existing private regulatory models in three ways. First, it envisions
privately-devised standards being developed subject to government oversight. IEEE, for example,
would not have the final say on what the standards should be; it would need to design those stan-
dards with a view to meeting government-set (politically accountable and legitimate) outcomes and
principles. Second, the model envisions a shift from voluntary to mandatory adoption of standards.
Companies would have the option of choosing whether to adopt IEEE standards or some competing
regulatory regime in some domain, for example, but they would not have the option of remaining
unregulated. Third, private regulators would have access to a wider range of enforcement tools than
they do now. The responses to the Bangladeshi work safety disasters, for example, depend on the
use of contract tools to enforce compliance. Under our model, regulators would have broader pow-
ers such as to the capacity to impose fines, require audits and supervision, and revoke licenses to
operate.
Critically, regulatory markets are not a means for self-regulation or delegation of regulatory over-
sight to a (target) industry. Targets are not regulating themselves; they are submitting to the regu-
latory regime of an independent private regulator. Instead of Google developing and implementing
internal procedures to protect a government-established right to be forgotten in search results, for
example, Google would submit to the procedures (or implement the technology) developed by a
third-party company or organization (Search Oversight Inc.).
6 BENEFITS OF REGULATORY MARKETS
The reason to build regulatory markets is to harness market incentives to invest in the development
of new regulatory technologies. Powerful incentives are driving corporations and nations to invest
in building and deploying AI as fast and as broadly as possible. We will require equally powerful
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regulatory systems to ensure that AI systems remain safe and beneficial. We will almost certainly,
for example, need AI to assist in monitoring and regulating AI systems. The only way to get robust
and durable investments in building regulatory AI is by creating a market incentive: rewarding such
investments with the achievement of profit and personal mission.
A key dynamic that we hope to capture is the start-up dynamic by which expertise in a domain
migrates out of large organizations into new entrepreneurial ventures. Much of the expertise about
the nature of the challenges we face with AI resides inside AI research labs–almost all of which are
housed inside corporations. Many of these corporations are also financing research on how to build
safe and responsible AI. By creating a market outlet for such expertise, we create the potential for
some of this expertise to migrate out of the corporations and into concrete efforts to build industry-
wide regulatory tools. In this vision, the AI safety/policy team at OpenAI, for example, could
become a start-up in the regulatory market: transforming its research into a concrete set of regulatory
tools and services that it first proves (to governments) achieve specific AI regulatory goals and then
sells to AI companies required by governments to submit to regulatory oversight.
Another benefit of the regulatory markets model is that it fosters the development of a robust and
independent regulatory sector. This can help balance the growing power of the large tech companies
that are at the forefront of AI development. It creates a middle option between the unsatisfactory
choice between government-led regulation on the one hand and tech company self-regulation on the
other.
Private regulators may be able to govern data more effectively. Currently, a critical constraint on
government regulation is that sharing data with governments creates the real and perceived risk of
the misuse of data by governments. Commercial entities, on the other hand, are able to engage
in more robust data-sharing arrangements, governed by contract and intellectual property rights.
This would allow private regulators to engage in more direct monitoring of data held within target
companies, and creates the possibility for more creative technological integration between regulator
and target.
7 RISKS AND LIMITATIONS OF REGULATORY MARKETS
Regulatory markets come with risks around the challenge of ensuring that private regulators are
competitive and independent of the entities they regulate.
Competition might fail because there is insufficient scale to support multiple regulators–if there are
only two or three companies involved in developing a particular type of AI, it will be difficult to
sustain a competitive market of regulators, each of which needs to regulate multiple entities and
each of which needs to be at risk of losing market share in order to prompt continual investment
in better regulatory technology. Even where there is sufficient scale, competition might not emerge
if a single regulator gains too much market share or if the costs of switching regulators (the threat
that keeps competitive pressure on regulators) is too high. Competition might also fail if regulators
collude. Some of these concerns can be addressed through the design of the regulatory environment
imposed by governments: antitrust and competition law could protect against the monopolization of
the regulatory market, but robust competition might require additional protections such as limitations
on market share or rules (about data portability and sharing, for example) to reduce switching costs.
The independence of regulators will require close attention. Regulatory capture is a known risk in
existing government-led regulation–both through explicit corruption and through more subtle mech-
anisms: campaign finance and lobbying, overlapping industry and regulator professional networks,
the dependence of regulators on information supplied by industry, etc. (Dal Bo, 2006) Regulatory
markets put an additional layer between governments and industry. This creates a risk that private
regulators, which are trying to sell their services to AI companies, will collaborate with those com-
panies to cheat on government goals. Protecting the integrity of regulation will require governments
to monitor the results achieved by private regulators and to have effective threats to condition, sus-
pend, or revoke the licenses of regulators that skimp on performance in order to win the business of
targets. This is a transformation of the existing problem of regulation: regulation is only as good
as the capacity and willingness of governments to regulate. With good design it is possible that
regulatory markets make it easier for governments to regulate: multiple regulators means multiple
sources of data and industry expertise. Participants in the regulatory market will also have an incen-
10
tive to monitor the performance of their competitors, perhaps exposing cases in which competitors
are “cheating” on regulatory outcomes to achieve markets share. At the same time, instead of reg-
ulating, for example, 1000 companies engaged in the production of AI systems in a given domain,
government will be focused on regulating perhaps 5 or 10 regulators.
Another risk is that governments will come under political pressure to displace private regulators in
response to high-profile accidents or crises. Legislators might then encroach on the domain of the
private regulator–moving away from specifying and evaluating outcome metrics and principles to
dictating more of the details of regulation. If this is anticipated it could undermine confidence in the
power of the private regulator and diminish the willingness of targets to cooperate with them.
Finally, although an important benefit of multi-jurisdictional regulators is that less-wealthy jurisdic-
tions can free-ride on the regulatory oversight of wealthier ones, a general free-riding problem could
result in governments as a whole under-investing in oversight.
8 COMPARISON TO EXISTING HYBRID REGULATORY MODELS
We can learn from the successes and failures in existing uses of private actors in regulation to under-
stand more about the possibilities and pitfalls of regulatory markets for AI and how best to design
those markets where feasible. In this section, we review two particularly powerful examples where
hybrid public-private governance models have failed and two examples that shows promise as mod-
els.
8.1 CREDIT RATING AGENCIES AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
In the U.S. private credit rating agencies (CRAs)–Moody’s, Standard & Poor, Fitch, and a handful
of smaller for-profit companies–supply ratings of the bonds issued by governments, for-profit com-
panies, and non-profit organizations. Private credit rating agencies emerged in the early 1900s as a
market response to investor demand for information on the credit risk associated with issuers. Today,
all CRAs use some form of the AAA to C- scale introduced in 1909 by John Moody to rate railroad
bonds. Investors originally paid for these ratings and there was no involvement from government.
During the 1930s, however, in response to financial crises, governments began to use ratings to reg-
ulate banks and other financial institutions. They did so by, for example, prohibiting banks from
purchasing securities rated as ’speculative’ (below BBB) by the private credit rating agencies. Then,
in 1973, the SEC issued a rule linking the capital requirement imposed on broker-dealers (the amount
a broker-dealer must maintain in liquid assets) to credit ratings assigned by what the SEC deemed
to be a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO)–a group that consisted at
the time of Moodys, S&P, Fitch, and Duff & Phelps. Following this rule, references to credit ratings
supplied by this group began to appear in a wide variety of financial regulations: banking, securi-
ties, insurance, pensions, and real estate. Over time, the business model of the credit rating agencies
shifted. Initially, agencies were paid by investors to supply information. In the 1970s, however,
agencies switched to an issuer-pay model, in which issuers paid on fees for the rating they needed
to sell securities. Partnoy (2009) calls the authorization issuers bought from agencies a regulatory
license. Only with the required credit rating could these issuers sell their debt-based instruments to
regulated entities such as banks, mutual funds, or pension funds.
The quality of credit ratings has been in doubt since at least the late 1990s (Partnoy, 1999). Orange
County was granted the highest-possible rating by S&P and Moodys for a bond issue just a few
months before filing bankruptcy in 1994. Enron was similarly highly-rated right up to its bankruptcy
in 2001. The failure of credit ratings to accurately reflect risk, however, was nowhere more spectac-
ularly on display than in the financial collapse of 2008, in which rampant gaming of credit ratings
in asset-backed securities resulted in the sub-prime mortgage crisis and a rapid downgrading of en-
tire classes of securities from AAA to junk status practically overnight. A Congressional inquiry
pinned the blame for the collapse squarely on the credit rating agencies (Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission, 2011).
The failure of credit rating agencies in the sub-prime mortgage crisis is a cautionary tale for regu-
latory markets. The lessons rest in an appreciation of the regulatory oversight of the credit rating
agencies, or more precisely, the lack thereof. When the SEC first designated approved credit rating
agencies as NRSROs in 1973, it did so without the creation of any direct regulatory oversight of
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these agencies. Indeed, the SEC exempted NRSROs from liability for the accuracy of their ratings
by shielding them from lawsuits brought by those who relied on them. The credit rating agencies
have successfully characterized their ratings as mere “opinions” about creditworthiness. Courts have
supported this lack of accountability by accepting arguments from credit rating agencies that they
are protected against liability for their ratings by principles of free speech. Even after the clear weak-
nesses in credit ratings became politically salient in the early 2000s, the 2006 Credit Rating Agency
Reform Act, while giving the SEC greater oversight powers, preserved the historical exemption from
liability and prohibited the SEC from regulating “the substance of credit ratings or the procedures
and methodologies by which any [NRSRO] determines credit ratings” (Partnoy, 2009).9 After the
2008 crisis, Congress ostensibly tightened regulatory oversight in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, creat-
ing the Office of Credit Ratings (OCR) within the SEC. The OCR was tasked with reviewing each of
the (now 10) NRSROs at least annually and publishing an annual report. The report, however, only
provides summary information and does not disclose the identity of a credit rating agency found
to have violated regulatory requirements (Partnoy, 2017). Moreover, the office does not have any
independent authority to bring enforcement actions and an overwhelmed SEC has engaged in little
enforcement activity. Finally, although Dodd-Frank removed the protection credit rating agencies
historically have enjoyed from lawsuits based on faulty ratings, the SEC has effectively reintroduced
such protections (Partnoy, 2017)).
A core lesson is clear: regulatory markets cannot operate effectively if they are not effectively
overseen by government agencies with budget and the capacity to resist capture. Without strong
oversight, private regulators may only ‘compete’ by lowering their standards. (Evidence of this is
provided by the example of S&P, which recovered from a negative shock to its reputation–caused
by errors requiring withdrawals of ratings–by issuing more optimistic ratings than its competitors
(Baghai & Becker, 2019).) Our proposal rests on the design of effective outcomes-based regulation
of private regulators.
A second lesson from the experience with credit rating agencies is related to the capture risk. The
market for approved credit rating agencies is not competitive. Although there are now 10 approved
NRSROs, the market is heavily dominated by just two: Moody‘s and S&P. Another key feature of
the design of regulatory markets needs to be active efforts to protect competition, limiting market
share if needed.
A third lesson can be taken from various diagnoses of why efforts to reign in the credit rating
agencies have failed. As several scholars have noted, it has proved tremendously difficult to reduce
the reliance on NRSRO ratings because of how deeply integrated they have become in so many
regulatory and financial schemes. This undermines the credibility of any threat to deprive a CRA
of approved status. The lesson for the design of regulatory markets for AI is that close attention
must be paid to the capacity to act on a threat to penalize a private regulator that is found not to be
producing the results required by government.
8.2 SELF-REGULATION AND THE BOEING 737 MAX CRASHES
In the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration is tasked with overseeing civil aviation.
The FAA is part of the Department of Transportation, which has the goal of ensuring “a fast, safe,
efficient, accessible, and convenient transportation system.” As part of that remit, the FAA oversees
airlines.
In 2018 and 2019 two Boeing “737 MAX” airlines crashed as a consequence of regulatory failure.
Specifically, software systems introduced by the plane manufacturer Boeing led to poorly docu-
mented behaviors by the plane in rare cases, which–combined with improperly trained pilots–caused
crashes to occur.
9The 2006 Act introduced a registration scheme for NRSROs and required registered NRSROs to provide
the SEC with regular information and certifications from users of its ratings. The SEC was authorized to
suspend a registration for failures to provide the required information or if the SEC made a determination that
an NRSRO “fails to maintain adequate financial and material resources to consistently produce ratings with
integrity.” 15 USC 78o-6 15E(d)(A)(5). The SEC was expressly prohibited, however, from “regulat[ing] the
substance of credit ratings or the procedures and methodologies by which any nationally recognized statistical
rating organization determines ratings.” 15 USC 78o-6 15E (c)(2).
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The suspected root of this failure was a lack of oversight by the FAA into the development of the ma-
neuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS) within the planes. This was a consequence
of the FAA delegating a large portion of regulatory oversight to aviation companies such as Boeing
themselves, through the “Organization Designation Authorization” (ODA) program.10
The ODA provided a formal mechanism for the FAA to delegate certain oversight activities to or-
ganizations and was created in response to activity in the aviation sector outpacing the FAAs own
ability to effectively regulate the sector. Prior to 2004, the FAA appointed Designated Engineering
Representatives (DERs) to perform oversight of a given product within an aviation company, and
this person–though being paid by the aviation company–would report directly to the FAA. Under the
ODA change, the FAA instead recognizes an ODA organization within an aviation company, and
this ODA selects staff who are themselves managed by the company. The FAA ostensibly oversees
the ODA via spot checks, but it engages in little direct oversight of the personnel within the ODA.
Both the DER and ODA system have had problems: A 2011 investigation conducted by the De-
partment of Transportation’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG), prompted by a request from a
congressman concerned about lack of oversight, found numerous instances in which manufacturers
had appointed or retained DERs with poor performance history or over the objections of FAA en-
gineers. The report also highlighted that some oversight officers did not even track DER personnel
by name and hence could not identify poor performers who lacked either technical skill or appeared
to be acting in the manufacturer’s interest at the expense of compliance. An analysis of the FAA’s
audits for 2005-2008 found 45 instances in which the FAA had not caught failures in certifications
of safety systems, such as a complete absence of “evidence that critical tests on a new aircraft engine
component were ever performed” (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2011). A subsequent report
in 2015 found that “one inspector responsible for oversight of nearly 400 manufacturing personnel
performing work on FAA’s behalf reviewed the work of only 9 personnel during fiscal year 2014”
(U.S. Department of Transportion, 2015).
Boeings implementation of the ODA caused it to change how it managed employees within its
safety organizations. Media reporting following the 2018 and 2019 crashes indicates that though
numerous people within Boeing had identified safety issues with regard to the software systems on
the 737-MAX, they had been discouraged from reporting these issues by their (Boeing) managers.
Additionally, people that worked for the FAA were being pressured by their own FAA managers to
rapidly qualify aspects of the plane for safety, despite lacking both the staff and time to do a good
job 11. These reports are consistent with a 2012 OIG investigation that substantiated allegations
from FAA staff responsible for overseeing Boeing that FAA managers were ignoring or overriding
efforts to hold Boeing accountable. Staff recommendations to remove a Boeing ODA administrator
and address conflicts of interest, for example, were overturned, moves seen by staff as “evidence
of [FAA] management having too close a relationship with Boeing officials” (U.S. Department of
Transportation, 2012).
It has been clear since 2011 and was put in stark terms by the 2015 OIG investigation that there
has been little meaningful oversight of Boeing for many years (U.S. Department of Transportion,
2015). The 2015 inquiry found that oversight was not risk-based, focused on meeting minimal
checklist requirements and minor paperwork errors instead of safety-critical systems, and lacked
an appropriate staffing model to ensure adequate resources for inspectors. Indeed, Boeing, with a
dedicated FAA oversight office for its ODA, was not in the staffing model at all; the determination of
how many inspectors to allocate was not based on data or risk analysis, leaving FAA with no ability
to assess the adequacy of staffing in that office. Gaps were especially large in the supply chain, with
“FAA performing oversight of only 4 percent of personnel conducting certification work on FAA’s
behalf in fiscal year 2014” (U.S. Department of Transportion, 2015).
The lessons from the Boeing 737 MAX disasters are still being learned but we can see at least
two so far for regulatory market design. One is that the pressure to devolve regulatory duties to
private actors is intense and has produced extensive reliance on self-regulation–even in safety-critical
contexts such as aviation. Our proposal for regulatory markets can improve on this by shifting
those duties to independent regulators, rather than the targets of regulation themselves. Second,
10https://www.faa.gov/news/testimony/news_story.cfm?newsId=23514&
omniRss=testimonyAoc&cid=105_Testimony
11https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-
the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/
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however, any regulatory scheme requires adequate oversight by governments. The insufficiency
of FAA oversight practices is a cautionary tale for our regulatory markets proposal, emphasizing
the need for a sustainable funding model that accords with the true cost of regulation. Under our
proposal, at least some of this cost would be priced in the market as the cost of regulatory services,
rather than being entirely dependent on the politics of taxation and government budgets.
If, instead of delegating regulatory duties to Boeing (or some other airplane manufacturer or engi-
neering entity), one (or several) of those manufacturers had spun-out a safety assurance startup to
operate as an independent private regulator, we could imagine this startup being overseen by the
FAA with the goal, for instance, “to guarantee the safety of new flight platforms, and guarantee that
typical pilots can be trained to use the platform within a day of study.” The startup, given that objec-
tive, would be incentivized to not only analyze the MCAS system for particular failure modes and
safety issues, but also to validate that human pilots could be trained against it. This startup would
face significant economic pressure to develop effective methods for overseeing such systems, but it
wouldnt face the same kind of conflict of interest that airline employees face when having objectives
(for instance, safety) that conflict with direct orders from their managers (qualify this plane quickly).
8.3 MEDICAL DEVICE SAFETY AND THE PRESSURE TO HARMONIZE REGULATION
We now turn to some more promising examples of hybrid public/private regulation, close to our
regulatory markets proposal, that have recently emerged. The first is in the regulatory arena for
medical devices. This example sheds light in particular on the pressure to build regulatory schemes
that can regulate at global scale.
Medical devices range from the simple (tongue depressors) to the safety-critical (cloud-connected
pacemakers). Regulators in most countries have detailed schemes, for devices deemed more than
minimally risky, that govern all phases of development, production, and marketing. In response to
the needs of companies attempting to sell their devices internationally, facing complex and conflict-
ing regulatory requirements, in 1992 a consortium of regulators from the U.S., Canada, Australia,
the E.U., and Japan formed the Global Harmonization Task Force (GHTF) consisting of regulators
and industry representatives with a goal of developing a uniform regulatory model for adoption in
member countries. Harmonization across jurisdictions has long been a goal of global efforts to re-
duce regulatory burdens on industry. The task force generated a regulatory model but acknowledged
in 2011 that, 18 years after the project began, the model had not succeeded in achieving uniform
regulatory practices in member countries. In addition, the group faced the challenge that over time
its membership was too narrow: it failed to reflect changes in the global market, excluding, for ex-
ample, Asian countries, and it excluded stakeholders other than manufacturers, such as healthcare
providers, academics, and consumers. In 2011, the GHTF disbanded.
The GHTF was replaced in 2011 by a new consortium of regulators known as the International
Medical Device Regulators Forum (IMDRF), consisting of regulators from the original member
countries of the GHTF plus, eventually, regulators from Brazil, Russia, China, Singapore, and South
Korea and observers from the World Health Organization. Learning the lesson of the failed GHTF
effort, instead of aiming at harmonized legislation to enact convergent regulatory systems in mem-
ber countries, the IMDRF has focused instead on technical convergence (such as a uniform device
identification system and standards for cybersecurity) and regulatory processes that don’t require
legislative change.
A major initiative of IMDRF has been the introduction of the Medical Device Single Audit Program
(MDSAP), which was piloted in 2014-2015 and became fully operational in 2017. The goal of this
program is to create a scheme in which a medical device can be audited by a single organization
for compliance with the (quality management) standards of any of the countries in which it will be
sold. Countries participating in the program agree to accept the audit report of the single auditor as
meeting the certification requirements of their regulatory scheme.
MDSAP authorizes private auditing organizations (AOs) to audit medical device manufacturers ac-
cording to protocols established by MDSAP. MDSAP then audits the auditors (engaging in what
are called ”witnessed audits” with reporting back to MDSAP and the AO) to ensure that they are
completing audits as required. The quality management standards reflect those implemented in all
jurisdictions in which the manufacturer seeks to distribute; in many cases, jurisdictions have con-
verged on a quality management standard promulgated by the International Standards Organization
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(ISO 13485). Device manufacturers purchase the auditing services of an AO and participating reg-
ulators (currently Australia, Brazil, Canada, Japan and the U.S.) accept this single audit report as
satisfying their requirements. As of August 2018, there were 14 AOs either fully recognized or
in the probationary period leading to full recognition. Participation by device manufacturers grew
more than ten-fold from 222 at the start of the operational phase in January 2017 to 2,711 by August
2018.
This model tracks many features of our regulatory markets proposal. There is a global competitive
market for auditors, with regulated entities paying a competitive price for services. These revenues
are used to cover the cost of audits.12 The government bodies focus on regulating the regulators–
auditing the auditors. The model is not a full representation of our proposal, in that the standards–
which are determined by the government regulators–are not necessarily outcomes-based; they may
be highly prescriptive. But the system enables a global market for regulation in which individual
countries are not obliged to adopt the same regulatory standards. They may have incentive to do
so, in order to reap the benefits of a more efficient auditing market that has developed to audit
for a particular set of standards, and indeed a few of the participating countries have adopted the
privately-devised quality standards developed and sold by the International Standards Organization.
Even with divergent standards, however, manufacturers can work with a single entity (auditor) to
achieve regulatory compliance that satisfies the requirements of multiple jurisdictions.
It is too early to assess the efficacy of the MDSAP. But with the credit rating agencies and 737MAX
failures in mind, we can see the potential for greater success. Unlike the credit rating agencies, there
is a formal oversight mechanism to discipline private regulators. And unlike the FAA weaknesses
that spelled disaster with the 737MAX, there is a third-party independent regulator and there are
formal, publicized procedures for regulating the regulator. Moreover, because the scheme has been
set up as a global consortium, there is less risk of capture: even if a regulator (auditor) can cap-
ture one government, it is unlikely to be successful at capturing five or six or more. The formal
structure of the market also helps here: the audits are provided by entities that have a global market
opportunity, which both encourages investment in discovering methods of accomplishing audits in
a cost-effective way and creates a greater penalty for a loss of reputation or loss of formal autho-
rization to perform audits. Last, by pricing at least some of the cost of regulation in the market
for regulatory services, the system is better protected against political pressures on the budgets of
government regulators.
The MDSAP model shows the feasibility of building global markets for independent regulatory
services that avoid the trap of harmonization efforts–which sank GHTF–and reduce the risks of
capture and failed regulation. All while recruiting the market to provide more nimble responses to
complexity and innovation.
8.4 LEGAL MARKETS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND LEGACY CONSTRAINTS ON
COMPETITION
As a final promising example, we turn to what may seem to be an unusual case: markets for legal
services. Historically, markets for legal services have been self-regulated by providers–lawyers–
acting through voluntary organizations such as bar associations and law societies. In 2007, however,
the U.K. adopted a novel scheme, prompted by concerns about capture and a lack of competition,
which tracks all of the features of our regulatory market proposal.
The 2007 Legal Services Act (LSA) created an independent government-appointed body, the Legal
Services Board (LSB)to govern the provision of legal services in England and Wales. Instead of
regulating lawyers, however, the LSB was authorized only to approve entities that applied to it for
authorization to regulate lawyers. The LSA set out governing principles–regulatory objectives–to
guide the LSB’s determination of whether to approve a regulator. The LSB in turn is required to
design and implement an adequate scheme for overseeing the regulators. Regulators report to the
LSB and the LSB retains the right to intervene in the exercise of regulation by a private regulator,
or seek to cancel the authorization to regulate, if the regulator appears likely to fail to achieve the
regulatory objectives.
12We have not yet been able to confirm the funding model for the MDSAP oversight body itself, whether it
is funded by auditing organizations–thus priced into the fees they charge in the market for their services–or by
contributions from participating governments.
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Under the 2007 scheme, the initial regulators included legacy regulators who had previously op-
erated as self-governing bodies, but only after those bodies had separated out their advocacy and
regulatory functions. The Law Society of England and Wales, for example, which had been the self-
governing body for solicitors, spun out a separate entity called the Solicitors Regulation Authority,
which became an approved regulator under the LSA. Currently 9 regulators are approved to regulate
individual providers; some of these regulators are also approved as licensing authorities capable of
licensing entities (known as “alternative business structures” which permit solicitors and barristers
to be employed by or contract to provide services with people and entities other than solicitors and
barristers.13
Any person or entity that wishes to provide one of six activities designated as “reserved” under the
LSA–including representation in higher courts or filing documents in court, for example14–must
obtain a license from an approved regulator and comply with the regulatory scheme its regulator
has devised. Fees for these regulatory services are paid by the licensed individual or entity to the
regulator; the LSB retains authority to regulate these fees.
A primary motivation for the development of these regulatory scheme in the U.K. was to address the
problem of regulatory capture. A 2001 review of the self-regulating professions (primarily solicitors
and barristers) by the U.K. Office of Fair Trading identified several rules imposed on legal practice
that have an adverse effect on competition and consumer welfare:, attributable to the fact that “the
professions are run by producers largely on behalf of producers”(Office of Fair Trading, 2001).
After the professions failed to make any adjustments to improve competition, a follow-on report
authored by a banker, recommended the regulatory regime ultimately enacted in the LSA (Clementi,
2004). A core concern of this report was to increase competition between providers–today, three
professions are all authorized to provide any of the six reserved activities, and other groups are
authorized to provide a subset so that there is broad scope for competition between different types
of professionals (barristers, solicitors, legal executives, accountants, and so on.) In this sense, the
LSA responded to the problem of regulatory capture with the technique we are advocating here: the
creation of competing regulators, overseen by a government body responsible for ensuring that the
regulatory market was harnessed to regulatory objectives set by Parliament (including the objective
of a competitive market for legal services.)
New business models and providers in the U.K. legal services market relatively quickly gained sig-
nificant market share–about a third within three to six years of the new regulatory scheme coming
into effect. New types of providers have shown greater propensity for innovation and achieve higher
rates of customer satisfaction (Legal Services Board, 2015). But the levels of innovation and in-
vestment that were contemplated have not yet arisen, and dissatisfaction with the regulatory regime
continues. A key challenge appears to be that the regime was built on legacy self-governing reg-
ulators and despite formal independence, these regulators have continued to regulate in ways that
are largely a continuation of the methods used historically. That is, there has been little regulatory
innovation.
The reason for low innovation appears to be that competition between approved regulators, while
available in theory, is very limited in practice. The legacy regulators regulate based on a professional
title: solicitor, barrister, legal executive, chartered accountant, etc. Access to the title is based heavily
on highly prescribed education or training and apprenticeship requirements. These requirements
make switching between regulators prohibitive for individual licensees, blunting any competitive
threat. Entities face a greater opportunity for switching regulators, but for several reasons this has
not yet produced much regulatory competition: entities only gained access to the market in 2012,
multiple licensing authorities only came on line after 2017, and entities are still only about 10% of
the market.
The lesson for other efforts to implement regulatory markets is that achieving regulatory competi-
tion requires close attention to the design of the market. The benefits of regulatory markets are only
13These are business models that were prohibited by the self-governing regimes that predated the LSA, and
which continue to be prohibited in most jurisdictions in the world, including the U.S. and Canada. (Hadfield,
2020)
14This designation of reserved activities is much narrower than it is in the U.S. and Canada, where all work
requiring the application of legal knowledge to individual circumstances must be done by a licensed lawyer
(Hadfield, 2020). Unreserved–unregulated–activities in England and Wales include all forms of legal advice,
the drafting of legal documents such as contracts and wills, and some representation in lower courts.
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achieved if there is true competitive pressure to improve on regulatory techniques. The market of
a given private regulator needs, therefore, to be contestable. This requires relatively low switching
costs. The U.K. system ended up with multiple approved regulators not because of an intention to
create a regulatory market; this was instead a consequence of the legacy of multiple legal professions
that had self-regulated. Had the regulatory design paid more attention to the goal of creating com-
petitive regulators, the problem of switching costs would likely have been recognized and relatively
easily addressed.
9 PROTOTYPE: VERIFYING ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS
To demonstrate how regulatory markets might work in practice, we describe in this section a proto-
type implementation to address a known risk in the AI domain: adversarial attacks on AI models.
With normal training, well-performing deep learning models can easily be fooled by specifically
(“adversarially”) crafted input (Szegedy et al., 2013). Figure 2 shows an example from image clas-
sification. Adversarial attacks can also interfere with the policies learned by deep reinforcement
learning agents (Behzadan & Munir, 2017; Huang et al., 2017).
“PANDA”
+
“GIBBON”
57.7% 99.3%
Figure 2: In this example of adversarial attacks in image classification from Goodfellow et al. (2015) the model
classifies the image on the left as a “panda” with reasonable confidence. But if presented with an image that
is constructed from the initial image plus a tiny amount of (appropriately chosen) perturbation, it classifies the
image as a “gibbon” with near certainty.
Adversarial attacks have been shown to be a vulnerability in AI systems, even if attackers do not have
access to the underlying model (Papernot et al., 2017) or if they only have the capacity to modify
features in the physical environment (Kurakin et al., 2016). The risks arising from adversarial attacks
range from degrading the efficacy of an ML–based decision system (e.g. reducing the reliability
of predicted labels on photographs) to undermining security protocols (such as those using facial
recognition or biometric images) to interfering with behavior in the real world (such as manipulating
the inferences drawn from visual input for an autonomous vehicle).
Defending against adversarial attacks is a substantial technical challenge. The research literature
contains multiple proposed defensive techniques (Papernot et al., 2017) and demonstrations of how
these techniques can fail (Carlini & Wagner, 2017; Uesato et al., 2018). But efforts to develop
methods for provably robust models appear promising (Katz et al., 2017; Singla & Feizi, 2019)).
The key observation is that the challenge of securing deep neural networks against adversarial attack
is one that draws on the same levels of expert analysis that the building of AI systems does. It is
therefore a setting in which it is likely that solutions will come from researchers who are engaged in
state-of-the-art AI research.
9.1 PARTICIPANTS IN THE MARKET FOR ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS REGULATION
Applying our model to the context of adversarial robustness we first define the relevant actors.
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9.1.1 GOVERNMENT
We presume a governmental agency that sets the outcome goals for regulation in some domain.
The domain might be narrow–the use of specific types of deep learning models in aircraft advisory
systems (as in Katz et al. (2017))–or it might be broad–the use of any deep learning models for any
purpose in any context. The choice of scope will be in part a function of technical considerations
as well as a function of the political environment and the nature of the risks involved. Ensuring
against adversarial attack in safety–critical systems that put large numbers of lives at stake may be
appropriately allocated to a specialist government agency, such as the FAA in the case of passenger
aircraft, with the capacity to regulate along multiple dimensions. In other settings, oversight might
be placed in a government agency that specializes in oversight of AI systems across a wide variety
of domains. The capacity for oversight of the government agency itself will be a factor: will the
electorate, legislative contestants, civil society organizations, and media be better able to evaluate the
performance of the agency if it is focused on a familiarly-defined domain, such as airline safety, than
if it is focused on a diffuse and novel domain, such as AI safety? And scale will be a consideration:
the oversight agency will require sufficient resources to engage in effective oversight but not such
immense scale that oversight of the government body itself is diluted.
We will assume we are looking at deep learning models employed by commercial drones. In this
domain, we can imagine a range of solutions in terms of the relevant government oversight bodies.
Oversight might be provided by national-level aircraft regulation agencies, like the FAA in the U.S.
Or it might be provided by local agencies responsive to the priorities of local communities, much as
ride-sharing services are often regulated at the city-level to respond to considerations about trans-
portation, protection of pedestrians and riders, and economic displacement of traditional for-hire car
services.
9.1.2 TARGETS
The targets of regulation are the companies implementing deep learning models in commercial
drones and which are required by the government oversight agency to purchase regulatory services
from private regulators the agency has approved. Targets might be defined as the companies that sell
commercial drones, companies that employ commercial drones (to deliver packages, for example)
and/or companies that supply deep learning models (software) to commercial drone manufacturers
or users. We can imagine that regulations enacted by the government oversight agency require any
entity employing or selling commercial drones to ensure that the deep learning models implemented
in the drones have been produced by a manufacturer or developer that is regulated by an approved
private regulator. The ultimate target of regulation would need to be capable of producing the data
required by and implementing any modifications to the model the regulator.
9.1.3 PRIVATE REGULATORS
The private regulators here would be private companies (for-profit or non-profit) that invest in the
research and development of techniques to evaluate the adversarial robustness of deep learning mod-
els in the commercial drone domain and supply regulatory services to targets. Engineers working
on technical safety in companies engaged in technical safety research – for instance, OpenAI, Deep-
Mind, and Google–would hopefully be incentivized to either start or join companies dedicated to
providing independent regulatory services.
9.2 LICENSING
Private regulators would be required to apply for a license to supply adversarial robustness regulatory
services in the commercial drone context from the government agency in any jurisdiction in which
they wished to operate. If regulation happens at the city level, for example, then a private regulator
would apply to individual cities for a license. Cities could conceivably recognize licenses supplied
by other cities. For example, if Regulator A is licensed by Los Angeles, San Francisco could accept
that license. Similarly, if Regulator B is licensed by San Francisco, Los Angeles might accept that
license. Targets wishing to supply or employ commercial drones in either city satisfy their regulatory
requirement by purchasing regulatory services from either Regulator A or Regulator B.
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Figure 3: In this market for regulating adversarial robustness in commercial drones, a private regulator (“R”)
is licensed to regulate on the basis of outcome metrics and principles supplied by government actors (poten-
tially including existing domestic regulatory agencies and legislatures as well as international bodies.) These
government actors would engage in oversight, in part by conducting audits, of the regulator and requiring the
regulator to supply data and reports. Drone manufacturers, developers, and companies deploying drones in
delivery services would be required by government to purchase the regulatory services of a licensed private
regulator, supplying the regulator with data and submitting to robustness regulatory requirements developed
and implemented by the regulator, such as auditing, licensing machine-learning engineers and requirements to
submit models to accuracy testing against test sets maintained by the regulator prior to deployment.
To be licensed to provide regulatory services, a private regulator would demonstrate to the appropri-
ate oversight agency that it satisfies the governments regulatory criteria. These criteria could include
concrete metrics–such as frequency of successful attacks during deployment. But they could also
include performance audits, case studies, and reviews. With multiple regulators operating in the
market, regulators might be incentivized or required to engage in contests such as those proposed
by Brown et al. (2018). They might also be incentivized to generate metrics that demonstrate safety
improvements they have achieved, relative to their competitors. With data from and access to the
experiences of multiple regulators, the government oversight agency would be better equipped (than
in the case of overseeing a monopoly private regulator) to verify the claims made by regulators about
factors such as the efficacy of their systems or the feasibility of improvements. Incentives to advance
regulatory standards could be generated either by positive industry reputation spurred by publicity
around oversight reports (securing a larger share of the market, particularly where incentives for
safety are supported by consumer preferences for safety) or by concrete advantages such as a period
of exclusive access to a share of the market.
Government oversight agencies would also be authorized to ensure that the market for private reg-
ulatory services in a given domain is competitive. Regulators that are affiliated with targets, for
example, will be required to ensure independence and protection of data confidentiality and trade
secrets. Total share of the market secured by a given regulator could be capped. Rules could be
enacted to ensure that targets can relatively easily switch regulators, such as by requiring regulators
to transfer test sets and results for a given target–preserving competitive incentives for regulators to
improve the efficiency of their techniques.
19
9.3 REGULATORY TECHNIQUES
The aim of regulatory markets is to create incentives for the private sector to allocate resources–
money, talent, and compute–to the challenge of developing more effective methods of defend-
ing against adversarial attacks. In addition to investment in techniques that improve robustness–
defending a broader class of models against novel adversarial techniques and larger perturbations to
input data–we also anticipate that private regulators can supply other services to clients. They could
provide expertise on how to do adversarial training and run formal verification on the resulting mod-
els during development phases. They could maintain hold-out sets of attack vectors (perturbation
types) that they do not show to their clients and against which the client could test their models.
Regulators would also be competing for clients by trying to improve the efficiency and reduce the
cost of robustness. Adversarial training is currently expensive to use. Provided the regulator can
continue to demonstrate that its techniques meet oversight requirements, it would face an incentive
to develop lower-cost training algorithms. Adversarial training can also come with an efficiency
loss–making commercial drones less effective at performing the tasks sought by users. Regulators
would also be competing to develop robustness techniques with lower efficiency costs.
We envision that the license awarded for a private regulator might initially be narrow in scope,
permitting, for example, only regulatory oversight of the adversarial vulnerability of deep learning
models of a particular class in commercial drones. But a virtue of creating a market for regulation
is that private regulators will have an incentive to expand their market access. This would play out
through proposals made by regulators to government oversight agencies for an expanded license.
Regulators might seek to develop techniques to verify robustness in a broader set of deep learning
models. They might seek to expand their remit beyond implementations in commercial drones. Or
they might seek to expand their regulatory capacity to other dimensions of the commercial drone
business: developing standards for safe exploration by drones, for example.
9.4 TRANSITIONING TO REGULATORY MARKETS
We have sketched this prototype under the assumption that government oversight agencies might
create regulatory markets from the top down. This may not be too much to expect in the domain we
are considering–commercial drones–because this is a novel domain and there are few pre-existing
regulatory regimes. Experimenting with a new approach seems possible here. Teams in industry and
academia are already focused on this area of research and in this limited domain sufficient safeguards
for data and independence could be put in place to enable existing safety teams within established
organizations to experiment with providing regulatory services to users outside of their organization.
A government that was ready to prototype regulatory markets for AI regulation in this highly speci-
fied domain would need to undertake the following steps. First, a government oversight body would
need to be established. This could be established within an existing regulatory agency, such as
the FAA in the U.S. But we suspect, particularly in light of what has been learned about oversight
efforts at the FAA recounted in our discussion of the Boeing 737 MAX crashes, the effort of regula-
tory innovation may be better served by establishing a novel, targeted, overseer, specifically tasked
with implementing outcomes-based and risk-based regulatory methods. Second, enabling legislation
would need to be enacted that creates the private regulatory regime: establishing outcome metrics
or principles or, more likely, authorizing the overseer to set metrics or outcomes based on legislated
principles to protect against adversarial attacks in commercial drone settings; authorizing the over-
seer to license and supervise private regulators based on their ability to meet and maintain these
outcomes; and requiring commercial drone manufacturers, developers, and users to purchase the
regulatory services of a licensed regulator. This legislation likely would also have to preempt other
regulatory requirements imposed on regulatory targets in this domain. It would be important for the
oversight body to be tasked, especially initially, not only with implementing the private regulatory
regime but also with collecting and monitoring data on the performance of the regulators and targets
to ensure that regulation is effective and the market is adequately competitive. The oversight body
would also require either the authority to directly supplement the enabling legislation to impose
any requirements needed to promote efficacy and competition or the capacity to propose legislative
changes to the appropriate legislative body. We can imagine that a government interested in proto-
typing this approach could engage in a carefully-reviewed pilot to develop final versions of enabling
legislation and regulatory/market design.
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We can also imagine, however, that in the absence of legislative initiative, this novel regulatory ap-
proach might grow, bottom up, out of industry self-regulatory efforts. Much regulation in technically
complex or novel areas originates in such efforts. Here, companies involved in the development of
commercial drones–developers of deep learning models to be deployed in drones, drone manufac-
turers, companies anticipating large-scale deployment of drones–might, in recognition of the risks
of adversarial attack, organize as a consortium to function, initially, in the place of a government
oversight agency. The consortium would establish oversight criteria, metrics and procedures. It
would then invite entities–including internal units of consortium members, operating under rules
for independence and confidentiality–to apply for authorization to regulate. These regulators would
develop robustness techniques and procedures for certifying the robustness of deep learning mod-
els and implementations. Public certifications could create an incentive for drone developers and
suppliers to obtain certification. The consortium could commit to developing criteria for oversight
that anticipate the kinds of oversight that a legitimate public agency could require and developing a
transition plan for oversight to be eventually handed to a public agency once proof-of-concept has
been completed.
10 CONCLUSION
Building safe machine learning systems requires not only technical innovations, it also requires
regulatory innovations. Research is advancing on techniques for certifying adversarial robustness,
for example (Katz et al., 2017; Singla & Feizi, 2019). The question remains, however, how actors
will be required or incentivized to implement safety techniques or submit to certification and how
certification will be conducted. Conventional approaches to regulation through government agencies
may work, but there are many doubts about the capacity of governments to regulate on the scale and
in the time-frame of rapid and complex AI innovation. Self-regulation may also succeed, but there
are obstacles there too–both in terms of reliability and in terms of legitimacy. Regulatory markets
offer the potential to harness the speed and complexity benefits of private markets, while ensuring
the legitimacy of regulation, all in the service of safer AI systems. We are not naive about the
challenges to be overcome; regulatory markets will require careful design and robust government
oversight. They will not be appropriate in all contexts. But the challenges here seem surmountable,
in ways that the responding to the failures of traditional regulation in complex technology markets
do not. At a minimum we urge governments and industry to begin to explore this new model for
regulation as a possible response to the mounting urgency of reigning in the risks of powerful AI.
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